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Nonstandard time wage premiums and employment effects: Evidence from an 
Australian natural experiment 
 
 
One of the major themes in recent industrial relations research, and a focal point of policy 
debate, has been the time of work, in particular how it intersects with the non-work activities 
of workers.  The phrases ‘work-family balance’ or ‘work-life conflict’ have been used to 
describe core issues involved. Significant research attention has been paid to the role of job 
characteristics, including long working hours and hours-related preferences.  The timing of 
work, at non-standard hours and particularly on weekends, has been relatively understudied. 
Corporate policy makers meanwhile have sought to encourage firms to be more ‘flexible’ or 
‘accommodating’ towards employees, and unions and public policy makers have tended 
towards regulation – either by banning work at certain times or above a certain number of 
hours within a time period, or by forcing employers to pay a premium for work in non-
standard times.  Such restrictions or obligations are not new and part of the push for greater 
labour market flexibility over the past three decades in many countries has involved the 
easing or removal of such restrictions or obligations, to promote employment growth.   
 
While movements in the opposite direction have been rare of late, an important one occurred 
in New South Wales (NSW), the most populous state in Australia, from 2010 to 2015.  As a 
result of a legislatively-driven ‘award modernization’ process that standardized employment 
conditions within an industry across the country, non-standard time premiums for working 
Sundays in retail trade (one of the largest employing industries) rose significantly there.  At 
the same time, no change was required in the second largest and adjacent state, Victoria.  
This provided the basis for an important natural experiment, comparing outcomes in the two 
states.  Employers anticipated major employment losses; unions major gains for employees.   
 
We examine the effects of increasing Sunday premiums on employment outcomes – number 
of employees, hours per employee, and the likelihood of working on Sundays – taking 
advantage of this natural experiment. By using Victoria as a counterfactual, and controlling 
for a range of state-specific factors, we isolate the effects of the rising Sunday premiums in 
NSW. We thus address whether there were adverse effects on employment levels in NSW, or 
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on the distribution of employment through the week.  We thereby consider whether 
regulation of working time through public policy has a valid role to play in influencing work-
life conflict. 
 
Time, work and pay 
 
Of all resources available to us, time is the one that becomes unavoidably scarcer. While real 
GDP per capita grows, the number of hours in a week remains fixed. At the heart of the 
debate on non-standard hours premiums is how individuals, families and society value their 
time and choose to allocate it. The choice between wage-earning work, household work, and 
leisure time depends not only on preferences and needs (and that of one’s family), but also on 
employment conditions including the wage rate. Work-life conflict results from demands 
placed on individuals with work and non-work roles and obligations.  Interdisciplinary 
research has identified time-based pressure as a primary determinant of work–life conflict, 
pressures which include long working hours, schedule inflexibility, and shift/overtime 
requirements (Greenhaus & Beutell 1985; Byron, 2005; Ford et al, 2007; Michel et al, 2010). 
While these studies have been concentrated in psychology and sociology, the economic 
aspects of when we work have been under-studied (Hamermesh, 2015). Yet the assumed 
growing demand for round-the-clock production and consumption – and an attendant 
workforce – is said to produce productivity and efficiency benefits for employers, and 
benefits for those workers who regard working on Sundays or evenings as no different from 
working on Tuesday afternoon. Some argue, for example, that more flexible working 
arrangements could benefit young students or dual income families who might be better able 
to work around study or family commitments (Deloitte Access Economics, 2015: 16-20). 
 
Descriptive Australian survey data show that younger and/or single employees in low-skill 
occupations in casual employment (akin to ‘zero-hours’ contracts) are more likely to work 
weekends or evenings (Daly, 2014). It is unclear whether this reflects the preferences of these 
individuals, or these individuals are less able to ‘buy’ greater amenity – namely, work during 
standard daylight hours (Hamermesh, 1999a; Hamermesh & Stancanelli, 2014; Scheffel, 
2011).  A number of Australian studies have shown working time preferences continue to 
follow societal norms of standard weekday working hours. Baker et al (2003) used matched 
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samples of Australian standard and shift workers to show both groups valued social time on 
evenings and weekends equally. Hosking and Western (2008) showed weekend work was 
significantly associated with work-family conflict for fathers, while evidence from the 
Australian Work and Life Index (AWALI) indicated that working Sundays in particular was 
associated with higher levels of work-life interference (Skinner et al, 2012; Skinner & 
Pocock, 2014). Contrary to claims that Sundays are no longer privileged, recent Australian 
studies also showed that Sunday remained a day for family and civic activities, more so than 
Saturday or any weekday (Craig & Brown, 2014; Bittman, 2005).  
 
This greater value attached to Sundays, and weekends generally, underlie the rationale for 
wage premiums in theories both of competitive labour markets and of institutionally based 
wage determination. Traditional economic theory argues that ‘compensating wages’ exist in a 
competitive labour market to compensate employees for onerous working conditions, 
including work at valuable social times; in this model, employees trade off wages against the 
cost of the dis-amenity (Rosen, 1986). The theory predicts that demand for labour at 
undesirable working hours will require premium rates to induce sufficient workers to work at 
those times, and that demand for more amenable working times is income-elastic 
(Hamermesh, 1999a, 1999b). 
 
While weekend work, and non-standard working hours generally, are obvious candidates for 
studying compensatory wages, they have been less studied than many other job 
characteristics, and there is an overall paucity of research on the link between compensatory 
wages and job attributes (Fernandez & Rosa, 2009: 196). Earlier studies focused on job 
characteristics including job stress (French & Dunlap, 1998; Groot & Maassen van den 
Brink, 1999), and risk of injury (Hamermesh, 1999b; Hersch, 1998). In Australia, Borland 
and Suen (1990) for example showed that wage premiums existed where the risk of fatal 
accident was higher. Studies of wage differentials for undesirable working hours are 
complicated by heterogeneous worker preferences (there might be enough workers who 
prefer non-standard work such that premiums for weekend work would be unnecessary). A 
number of US studies have shown, however, that the decision to work non-standard hours 
results from the premium incentives and not worker preferences (Kostiuk, 1990; Lanfranchi 
et al, 2002). The undesirability of weekend and evening work is also indicated by the 
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demographic profile of these workers, with lesser educated, younger and minority employees 
(such as immigrants) with lower bargaining power and therefore more likely to work outside 
standard hours, and within low-skill occupations (Hamermesh & Stancanelli, 2014; Scheffel, 
2011; Daly, 2014). Furthermore, declines in evening and night work in the US have been 
explained by workers (particularly those at the upper end of the earnings distribution) using 
increased earnings to ‘buy’ more work amenity – namely, to work during standard daylight 
hours (Hamermesh, 1999a; 1999b). Together these findings suggest that there are strong 
preferences for standard working hours, and that premiums are needed to induce voluntary 
labour supply at undesirable hours. 
 
There have been limited studies on the timing of production and labour demand. In perhaps 
the only study of its kind, Cardoso et al. (2012) analysed data on 964 Portuguese firms across 
all industries, examining hour-by-hour employment through the week. They showed that 
employers were able to substitute work at one time of day in the week for another in response 
to different wage rates. The authors concluded that wage premiums could be an effective tool 
for social policy on working time.  
 
These studies assumed that wage premiums are generated by a competitive market. However, 
theories of the competitive market, including compensatory wage differentials, remain 
contested, and struggle to explain the large wage gaps across industry, occupation and gender 
in Australia (Preston, 1997). In contrast, the industrial relations and sociology literature 
argues that premiums for non-standard work hours are embedded in social norms and 
institutions. In Australia, the notion of ‘normal’ hours of work was first formalised in 1909 
by the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration, which awarded a time and a 
half premium (‘penalty payment’) for: 
All the time of work on the seventh day in any week, or an official holiday, and all 
time of work done in excess of the ordinary shift during each day of twenty hours 
Barrier Branch of the Amalgamated Miners Association v. Broken Hill Pty Ltd  
(1909, cited in Jones, 1981) 
 
It aimed to deter employers from impinging on workers’ limited leisure opportunities. 
Various subsequent cases dealt with such issues (Department of Education, Employment and 
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Workplace Relations, 2012:4-5). In 1981, the community standard, drawn from diverse areas 
of employment, was stated as including: a standard Monday to Friday 40 hour work week, 
with a time and a half Saturday rate and double time Sunday rate (Department of Industrial 
Relations, 1981, cited in Dawkins, 1986).  Not long afterwards, following a union campaign 
in manufacturing, the ‘standard’ working week was set at 38 hours (Department of 
Education, Employment and Workplace Relations, 2008).  
 
These community standards remain robust, with 69 per cent of Australian employees in 2012 
still reporting that they work only weekdays (ABS, 2012a).  The proportion of employees 
working some time on weekends rose from around 25 per cent in 1997 to 31 per cent in 2012 
(Bittman, 2005; ABS, 2012a). The 2014 AWALI survey showed that of the 45 per cent of 
employees who receive any premiums (called ‘penalty rates’ in Australia), 38 per cent 
indicated that they would not continue working unsocial hours if premiums were removed 
(Daly, 2014:17). 
  
Data on the retail industry, the focus of this article, suggests an even stronger role for 
premiums. The AWALI survey indicates that 37 per cent of retail workers worked on 
weekends only, with a further 15 per cent working evenings and weekends (Daly, 2014). 
More than half (57%) of retail employees working ‘anti-social’ ours received premiums, and 
of these, over half of retail workers (52%) said that they would not continue working 
weekends or evenings without the inducement of penalty rates. 
 
Contemporary debate in Australia on Sunday premiums addresses two issues. The first is 
whether Sundays are indeed valued more highly than Saturdays and weekdays by workers, 
with some advocates suggesting the ‘24/7’ economy renders them an accident of history 
(Turnbull in Bourke, 2015). However, the studies mentioned above suggest that people still 
reserve Sundays for family, social and civic activities, and that working on Sundays induces 
work-family conflict. The second issue is to what extent compensating employees for 
working on Sundays has an adverse effect on employment outcomes. This latter issue is the 
core focus of the remainder of this article. 
 
The analysis that follows measures the effect of increased Sunday premiums on employment 
in the NSW retail industry. A challenge with identifying such an effect is disentangling it 
from those arising from a range of other social and economic phenomenon.  These could 
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include the deregulation of trading hours, shifts in the business cycle, and changes in labour 
demand in other industries – each of these could have an independent effect on employment, 
which would be easy to conflate with the effect that premiums might have. In order to isolate 
the effect of higher Sunday premiums, the research uses a quasi-natural experimental 
framework, which exploits the exogenous changes in NSW Sunday premiums during the 
award modernization process.  The next section details these policy changes, and then an 
empirical model is laid out. 
 
Institutional background  
An ‘award’ in Australia is a legally binding decision of an arbitral tribunal that sets minimum 
pay and conditions in an industry.  Nationally, around 19 per cent of Australian employees in 
2014 had their minimum pay and conditions determined by an award (they are ‘award-
reliant’), including 29 per cent in the retail industry (ABS, 2014b).  Another large group have 
their pay set above the award rate but it is still determined by reference to it.  The number of 
firms for whom this is the main method of setting pay (25 per cent) is similar to the number 
of firms who use exactly the award rate (Yuen et al, 2015).  Both these numbers decrease as 
employer size raises, the former more so.  In total, 54 per cent of Australian retail employees 
have their pay set or guided in some way by the applicable award rate of pay (Wright & 
Buchanan, 2013).  Many retail employees—36 per cent, the second highest of any industry—
are employed on a casual basis, meaning they have no leave entitlements and their contract of 
employment lasts only for the current shift, making it easier for employers to adjust both the 
number of jobs and the number of hours worked.  Casual employees tend to have higher 
award reliance—nationally, 45 per cent of casuals are on award rates, compared to 18 per 
cent of non-casuals—and this is one reason why award reliance is higher in retail than most 
other industries (ABS, 2014a). 
 
Until the 2000s, award rates could differ between states.  The ‘award modernization’ process 
introduced new national minimum standards for employment pay and conditions across 
different industries and occupations, in place of multitudinous state-based awards. In the 
retail industry, these conditions included a 100 per cent (‘double time’) Sunday premium in 
the new General Retail Award. This new national standard enabled a quasi-experiment 
between award-reliant retail employees in NSW and Victoria – Victorian employees saw no 
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change to their Sunday premiums, whereas NSW employees moved from receiving a 50 per 
cent Sunday premium (‘time and a half’) to 100 per cent.  
 
Award modernization in retail included transitional arrangements, in place from 1 July 2010 
to 1 July 2014. Sunday premiums increased incrementally, by 10 percentage points, with 
effect each year from 1 July 2010 to 1 July 2014 (Table 1Table 1), but were announced on 
December 19, 2008.  Changes in other entitlements were relatively small or zero. As NSW 
trading hours were effectively deregulated by 1999, (National Competition Council, 1999; 
New South Wales Government, 2007) trading hour regulations between NSW and Victoria 
were substantially the same from the year 2000 onwards. Our analysis uses data from 
between 2001 and 2015, and is therefore unaffected by either changes in trading hours, or the 
national introduction of the Goods and Services Tax in July 2000. 
 




Data and Methodology 
We investigate the announcement and implementation of increases in the Sunday premiums 
in the NSW retail industry, and their effects on the following: 
 Total number of workers employed; 
 Hours worked per employee; and  
 The probability of working on Sundays in the NSW retail industry.  
A challenge lies in ascertaining what would have happened in the NSW retail industry in the 
counterfactual scenario, that is, in the absence of the policy change. In this case, there is a 
proposed control group for NSW retail employees – Victorian retail employees. Victorian 
retail was unaffected by the changes in Sunday premiums, and as shown below, exhibits 
similar employment trends to NSW retail.  We cannot include other states in the analysis, as 
each state had a different suite of changes to their award conditions.  The analysis uses a 
difference-in-difference, quasi-experimental framework to exploit the exogenous increases in 
Sunday premiums in the NSW retail industry, compared to fixed rates in the Victorian retail 
industry. The differencing of the two states’ outcomes removes biases from simple 
comparisons over time in NSW alone that may be due to time trends unrelated to the change 
in Sunday premiums (Imbens & Wooldridge, 2009:67). 
The analysis is based on two data sources: 
1. published quarterly aggregate data from the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) on 
the number of retail industry workers and hours per employee in New South Wales 
and Victoria, are the main source of data for this study; and 
2. longitudinal data from the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia 
(HILDA) survey on individuals working in the retail industry in both New South 
Wales and Victoria. HILDA is an annual longitudinal survey of over 13,000 
individuals that commenced in 2001 (and was available up to 2013 only). The HILDA 
dataset includes data on demographic characteristics, hours of work, employment 
characteristics and whether individuals usually work on Sundays. The HILDA survey 
fieldwork is undertaken from late July or August each year, with about 80 per cent of 
the sample collected in September and October between 2001 and 2010, and in 
August and September from 2011 onwards. 
Data on the total number of workers are derived from the ABS’s Labour Force Survey. The 
sample is based on the 2011 Census of Population and Housing, and data collected from 
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about 26,000 households. The survey is collected each month starting on the first Sunday 
after the 5th of each month, with households being surveyed in the first instance face-to-face, 
and henceforth by phone. Each month, one-eighth of the sample is rotated out and replaced. 
The survey collects a range of employment data, including labour force status, demographics, 
and hours of employment; every third month, occupation and industry data are obtained. The 
Labour Force Survey also derives the hours per worker by dividing the number of aggregate hours by 
the number of workers (it does not survey individual-level hours directly). We replicate this process 
for the NSW and Victorian retail industry. 
The annual changes in employment (employed persons as well as hours per employee) are 
presented for both states in Table 2. The average annual change in the number of employees 
for the years 2001 to 2008 (up to the announcement of increases in penalty rates) in NSW 
was 3.9 and 1.9 percent in for Victoria. From 2008 to 2014, the average annual change was -
2.0 percent in NSW and 1.8 percent in Victoria. Similarly, hours per employee fell on 
average 0.9 percent in the years post-announcement in NSW, compared to no change in 
Victoria. These changes may be owing to the increases in NSW penalty rates, however this 
raw data ignores potentially significant factors which are addressed in the empirical model 











Use of data on total employees and hours per employee allows for assessment of the effects 
of the changes in Sunday premiums on employment. As a check on this analysis, we use 
individual-level data to measure whether employers shifted the distribution of employment 
away from Sunday to other days of the week. A reduction in employment as a result of the 
higher premiums could only have occurred if Sunday employment fell. It is possible that a 
reduction in employment has occurred but it is so small as to be not statistically significant, 
but if we also find that there has been no reduction in the likelihood of a retail employee 
working on Sunday, then it would seem very unlikely that there has been any employment 
effect arising from higher Sunday premiums in NSW.  Conversely, if there is both a 
significant reduction in total employment and a significant reduction in Sunday employment, 
then it is likely that there has been some employment effect from the change in Sunday 
premiums.  Other combinations of findings would give us reason to be cautious: a significant 
and consistent fall in total employment, but no significant reduction in Sunday employment, 
would raise questions as to whether some other, unobserved factor (other than Sunday 
premiums) is at work.  A significant reduction in Sunday employment with no accompanying 
loss in total employment would raise questions as to whether losses in Sunday employment 
have been offset elsewhere. 
Any shift in Sunday employment implies a change in Sunday wages relative to the wages on 
other days, but data limitations make it challenging to estimate the extent of this intermediate 
step. A difficulty arises in observing hourly wages through employee-level self-reported data: 
the ABS uses more reliable data collected from employers (not employees) in the Survey of 
Employee Earnings and Hours (EEH), but does not collect or publish hourly wage data from 
the LFS.  Data from the more reliable EEH survey showed a higher wage increase amongst 
retail workers in NSW than in Victoria between May 2010 (before the first increase) and May 
2012 (after the second), but these data could not be limited to employees working Sundays 
and was not available in other years (ABS, 2012b).  As the EEH does not provide aggregate 
state-and-industry-level data on the distribution of wages throughout the week, we instead 
use individual-level data to look for indications of a wage effect induced by the reform. 
Table 3 describes the hourly wage data from HILDA on retail employees in the two states 
before and after the announcement of the policy change1. We present both mean and median 
                                                 
1 We present announcement date effects in order to align with those found in our later results, which found that the effects of 
the policy change were strongest following announcement rather than implementation date. 
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values, which differ substantially due to the small sample and high variability in the data. The 
first two data columns show that NSW employees working on Sundays, on average, had 
wages 2.72 percent lower than their counterparts in Victoria before the announced increase in 
Sunday rates. After the announcement, NSW wages for Sunday workers were on average 
1.57 percent higher – this constitutes a 4.29 percentage point turnaround. Using median 
values, the increase was 16.92 percentage points. By comparison, NSW employees not 
working on Sundays did not experience a commensurate increase in wage premiums (using 
either mean or median values). Table 3 also shows that Aa more formal difference-in-
difference model2 of these wage effects produced results as expected – a large and positive 
announcement effect (9.5%) on the hourly wages of Sunday workers in NSW, but shown to 
be statistically insignificant due to the small sample size and high variability in wages data; 
for non-Sunday workers in NSW, a small (1.0%) and statistically insignificant effect.  
 
  








On balance, it appears likely that wages for Sunday retail workers in NSW did rise by more 
than wages for their Victorian equivalents after the increase in Sunday premiums, but we are 
cautious in being conclusive on this issue.  While the causal chain from official premium, to 
wages paid, to changes in employment is of interest, it is not possible here to precisely 
investigate each link of the chain; our interest remains on the ultimate employment effects. 
                                                 
2 We  implemented basic difference-in-difference models of the logarithm of hourly wages, including year and state dummy 
variables, and comparing NSW to Victorian retail employees. These results are available from the authors upon request. 
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Table 4 shows summary statistics from pooled HILDA data on workers in NSW and 
Victorian retail workers. The ‘before’ data were collected in 2007 to 2008. The ’after’ data 
were collected from 2009 to 2013. The sample of retail workers includes 826 distinct 
individuals in NSW and 746 in Victoria, totalling 3714 observations over the seven-year 
period.  
 
Overall the data in Table 4 show majorities of retail workers are female, live in metropolitan 
areas, have completed Year 12 high school education, and work part-time for large 
employers. In addition, significant proportions are married, work as casuals—that is, without 
holiday or sick leave, and without guaranteed employment beyond the current shift.  Many 
are under the age of 25. 
  
The difference-in-difference regression framework allows for controls on the observed 
differences between the NSW and Victorian retail workers. The table also shows that there 
are some clear observed differences between retail workers in the two respective states before 
the premium changes. First, a greater proportion of respondents in NSW were female, who 
may preference non-standard hours differently to males. Second, a higher proportion of retail 
workers in NSW were under the age of 25 (44.7% compared to 38.6% in Victoria). Third, a 
higher proportion of NSW retail workers were employed on a part-time or casual basis. These 
are important controls, as part time of casual workers may be more likely to work on 
weekends, and so we consider whether their employment is more sensitive to changes in 
labour demand as a result of changes in premiums.  
The proportion of respondents in NSW who reported working on Sundays fell slightly from 
25.3 to 23.7 per cent, compared to a similar decline in Victoria (falling from 22.7 to 20.6 per 
cent). The analysis that follows includes important individual controls that may have had 























Our quasi-experimental approach, the difference-in-difference regression model, compares 
the outcomes of a ‘treatment’ group to that of a counterfactual ‘control’ group. Here, the 
treatment refers to the increase in Sunday award premiums in the NSW retail industry. The 
treatment group is retail workers in NSW, while the control group is retail workers in 
Victoria. There are also multiple treatments – rather than there being a single policy 
intervention, the transitional arrangements inscribed five annual increases in NSW, beginning 
on 1 July, 2010. However, the higher Sunday penalty rates were announced on December 19, 
2008, almost two full years before their implementation. It is possible that retail employers 
reacted to the announcement of higher Sunday wages, and adjusted their employee numbers 
or hours per employee accordingly. In this case, we might observe a significant decline in 
employment following the announcement in 2008, together with a distribution of 
employment away from Sundays, although our data does not allow us to observe solely 
Sunday working hours 
 
The evaluation period consequently measures the outcomes between  February 2009 and 
February 2015 (the ‘after’ period following announcement and implementation), compared to 
the period between February 2001 and November 2008 (the ‘before’ period). The ‘before’ 
period is chosen to maximize the sample period before the policy intervention following 
deregulation of Sunday trading hours in both Victoria (1996) and NSW (in practice by 1999, 
according to the National Competition Council). It also excludes the introduction of the 
nationwide Goods and Services Tax, Australia’s main consumption tax, in July 2000.  
 
The key assumption for the model is that employment trends would be the same for both 
states in the absence of the reform (and are not systematically related to unobserved factors). 
In the following analysis, the regression form of the difference-in-difference model is used to 
allow for multiple treatments (on the one treatment group), state-specific controls, and a 
state-specific trend. The empirical model is specified as follows: 
 
 
∑ , ∑ ,    (1) 
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In equation (1), 	  represents state-specific effects,	  periodic (quarterly) time effects, and 
 represents a state-specific time trend. Controls for observed state-specific factors are 
contained in the vector , and includes time-varying, state-level unemployment rates, 
employment to population ratios, and state retail sales. These variables are particularly 
important for controlling for potential state level effects of the global economic crisis of 2008 
and 2009. Large fluctuations in retail employment were significantly explained by these 
state-level economic factors3, with the incremental effects of the higher penalty rates 
subsequently estimated more precisely. The effect of the increase in Sunday premiums is 
captured by the parameters 	in the second sum (k= 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6) representing the effects 
following the announcement of changes, and also each of the increases). These are the 
coefficients on the indicator variables , which take a value of one if the observation took 
place in NSW in a period after the announced increases, and zero otherwise. 
The outcome variable  refers to two distinct employment outcomes: the logarithm of total 
number of retail employees, and the logarithm of number of hours worked per employee in 
retail, in state s at time t. Quarterly aggregate time-series data is used. Ordinary least squares 
regression is used to estimate equation (1).  Newey-West heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation consistent (HAC) standard errors have been used to mitigate in particular 
concerns raised by Bertrand et al (2004) regarding the effect of serial correlation on 
difference-in-difference models. 
The critical challenge is identification. The key identifying assumption underlying the 
empirical analysis is that NSW and Victoria shared common employment trends prior to the 
policy changes. Error! Reference source not found.Figure 1 shows the total number of 
retail workers in NSW and Victoria from 2001 to 2008, with a fitted trend line. It shows that 
over the period, the two states have moved broadly in parallel, despite considerable 
variability induced by the financial crisis from 2007.  
  
                                                 













A formal test of this identifying assumption takes the form of a ‘placebo test’, following the 
specification used in Autor (2003). In equation (1), the first sum refers to the ‘lead’ effects in 
the two years before the announcement of higher Sunday rates. The test is designed to detect 
spurious treatment effects where there should be none, and a finding of no significant effects 
in the years prior to the policy announcement lends support to the causal interpretation of 
results (Angrist & Pischke, 2009; Autor, 2003).  Finally, the addition of state-specific time 
trend allows for the possibility that pre-existing employment trends were important to 
subsequent employment outcomes, and acts as a further robustness check on the 
identification strategy (Angrist & Pischke, 2009; Besley & Burgess, 2004).  
 
A second model uses individual-level data and measures changes in the distribution of 
employment away from Sunday. This model acts as an important check on the results of the 
model in equation (1). The outcome measure in this case is binary variable  indicating 
whether an individual i in state s in year t reports working on Sundays. A linear probability 
model is used to estimate equation (2) using individual-level panel data (probit models gave 
similar results, and results are available from the authors). Heteroskedastic-consistent, 
clustered-by-individual standard errors were used. 
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∑     (2) 
 
In this case, individual-level controls captured by  includes gender, marital status, 
presence of dependent children, part-time and casual employment status, education level, 
binary youth indicator, union member status, and employer size. The evaluation ‘before 
period’ relates to data collected between 2007 and 2008, while the ‘after period’ follows 
announcement and implementation of the higher Sunday rates, and includes 2009 to 2013. 
Note that the individual level, annual data were only available to 2013 (with data collected 
mostly in August and September), and consequently only the first four increases in Sunday 
premiums are evaluated. In addition, we do not observe hours worked on Sunday, so are only 
able to capture employees who ceased working on Sundays, and not reductions in Sunday 
hours. 
A causal interpretation of our results assumes that there are no systematic differences 
between retail employees in NSW and Victoria. Aside from controlling for observed 
differences between the two groups, a variation on the placebo test was also used to check the 
individual-level results for Sunday employment, to ensure we are not reporting spurious 
effects. Specifically, the model was replicated estimating the effects of working on Saturday 
– there were no changes to Saturday wage rates in NSW, and Saturday penalty rates in 
Victoria fell slightly (on average from 33% to 25% over five years). There should be no 
change then in the likelihood of NSW retail employees working on Saturdays. The estimated 
placebo effect in NSW should be insignificant, or slightly negative if the fall in Victorian 








We use two measures of employment: the number of jobs, and the number of hours worked 
per worker. Both measures are relevant to the policy question.  In particular, if the number of 
jobs remains unchanged but the hours per worker decreases (increases) in response to a rise 
(fall) in Sunday premiums, it likely means that the same number of employees are offsetting 
the gain (loss) in hourly pay by each working fewer (more) hours.   This in turn influences 
whether, and in what form, there is a transfer in welfare between employees and employers.  
For example, if the same number of employees work more (fewer) hours for the same weekly 
income, and have less (more) leisure, while profits necessarily increase (decrease), there is an 
unambiguous shift in welfare from (to) employees to (from) employers. 
 
The results of the regression analysis of employment effects are presented in Table 5. Figures 
2 and 3 provide graphical illustrations of the employment effects arising from the increase in 
Sunday wage premiums, on the total number employed and hours per worker, respectively. 
These figures not only give insight into the dynamics of how the rollout of higher Sunday 
rates affected employment, but also show that in the lead up to the announcement (pre-2008), 
there were no spurious effects detected.  
 
In table 5, the key results are the coefficient estimates on the date variables. The treatment 
effects are identified in the years 2008 (following announcement) to 2014 (following the final 
increase in Sunday rates). In addition to testing the null hypotheses – that the annual effects 
following the announcement and rollout of Sunday rate increases were each statistically no 
different from zero– tests were also conducted on the sum of the treatment coefficients This 
determines whether the cumulative effect of the five premium increases from their 
announcement onwards, was statistically different from zero. The coefficients on the years 
2006 and 2007 form a placebo test of our identification strategy, and are discussed further 
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The results in Table 5 and Figure 2 show no consistent effects on the number of jobs. There 
appeared to be no significant announcement effect in the period between the announcement 
and implementation of changes, and only a weakly significant 5.1 per cent increase in the 
number employed in 2011. As shown in Figure 2, the magnitudes and directions of the effects 
varied and were mostly statistically insignificant. A test on the sum of the treatment 
coefficients taken from announcement date showed that the cumulative effect between 2008 
and 2014 was weakly significant and negative (p-value=0.079). Taken from implementation 
date, the cumulative effect was found to be statistically insignificant (p-value=0.176).    
The results for hours per worker (Table 5 and Figure 3) suggested a significant announcement 
year effect, with a significant drop of 5.2 percent. The implication could be that many 
employers paid more attention to news about the existence and size of the changes than about 
their formal dates of effect.  There was no significant change in hours per worker in other 
years, however the test on the cumulative effect taken from announcement date was 
statistically significant and negative (p-value=0.027). Taken from implementation date 
however, the cumulative effect was statistically insignificant (p-value=0.18). Figure 3 also 
clearly shows that the impact on hours per worker appeared to be less variable. However, this 
may be because much of the heterogeneity in workers’ hours is lost by deriving hours per 
worker from aggregate figures, rather than surveying individuals directly.  
The negative announcement effect on hours per worker, combined with the lack of effect on 
number of workers, led to an overall weakly significant and negative effect on total hours 
worked (not shown, but available upon request).  
The state-level controls for employment conditions and aggregate demand, including 
employment-to-population ratios, unemployment rates, and retail sales, were jointly 
significant. State employment-to-population ratios were highly significant proxies for 
available employment opportunities. The models also found large and positive state-effects 
on hours per worker (with a weakly significant result for number of jobs). The state effects 
captures unobserved but time-invariant differences between NSW and Victoria, and indicate 
that employment is generally higher in NSW (as illustrated earlier in Figure 1). 
A formal test of our identifying assumptions, drawing on Autor (2003), is provided using the 
estimation of ‘lead effects’ in the two years (2006 and 2007) preceding the announcement of 
higher Sunday rates. In Table 5 (and Figures 2 to 3), the lead effects are both close to zero 
and statistically insignificant, as expected. This absence of spurious lead effects supports the 
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causal interpretation of our results. An additional robustness check, suggested by Besley and 
Burgess (2004), entails the inclusion of the state-specific trend in our empirical model. As 
shown in Table 5, this inclusion of a state-specific trend did not suggest a significant role for 
pre-existing state employment trends.  
Overall, the results for employment effects suggest that the predominant response to the 
announcement of higher Sunday penalty rates was a downward adjustment in hours per 
worker and consequently total employee hours in anticipation of their rollout. There was 
however, no clear evidence of an effect on the total number of jobs. Taken from 
announcement date, the impact on job losses was weakly significant and negative; the impact 
on hours per employee was found to be significant. Taken from implementation date onwards 
however, the effects were in both cases statistically insignificant. The difference in these 
cumulative results (post-announcement versus post-implementation) suggests that despite the 
five-year period for implementation, adjustments were made early in the transition. This is 
despite the high levels of casual employment which allow employers to change employee 
hours at a shift’s notice.  
It is clear that the effect on the number of jobs, if it exists at all, is much weaker than the 
effect on the number of hours worked per worker. That is most, perhaps all, of the adjustment 
is in the form of fewer hours being worked at higher rates of pay, rather than fewer people in 
jobs. This is unsurprising, given the dominance of part-time and casual employment in the 
retail industry. In fact, because reducing hours is usually cheaper than layoffs, adjustment via 
hours can also occur among full-time, permanent workers, at least where they are rostered to 
work overtime on a Sunday (and their overtime hours can be cut). That said, a resistance 
point is reached if workers are already on standard full-time hours: they will strongly resist 
being converted to part-time hours, and retrenching full-timers due to a change in one day’s 
wages would be needlessly expensive. So the high rate of part-time, casual work in the 
industry especially encourages adjustment through hours, not jobs. 
 
Working on Sundays 
As a check on to these findings on the number of jobs and hours per worker, we investigate 
whether there was a shift in employment away from Sundays - it is possible that NSW 
employers did not simply reduce staff and/or working hours, but rather redistributed them 
away from Sunday.  
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Aggregate data on working time arrangements across Australia in 2006, 2009 and 2012 are 
first presented in Figures 4 and 5. The data relates to employees across all industries. They 
show that 9 per cent of males, and 8 per cent of females, usually worked on Sundays; these 
figures rose slightly in the 2009 survey, and fell again in 2012. This pattern was consistent for 
Saturdays as well – about 18 per cent of males and 13 per cent of females report usually 
working on Saturdays. This national data shows some stability in the incidence of weekend 








As was shown in Table 4, about 24 per cent of the sample of NSW retail employees in the 
HILDA sample reported usually working on Sundays, compared to about 21 per cent of 
Victorian retail employees. The regression results in Table 6 show the change in the 
probability of working on Sundays following the announcement of higher Sunday wage rates 
between 2009 and 2013. The effect is estimated using a linear probability model, and can be 
interpreted as follows: the coefficients indicate whether the probability of Sunday 
employment fell following the announcement and rollout of the Sunday wage rate increases. 
The results are presented without additional controls (Model 1); with controls for 
demographic differences between employees in the two states (Model 2); and with controls 
for workplace differences (Model 3). These controls are important because, as was shown in 
Table 4, retail employees in NSW differed from those in Victoria in observed attributes. 
These attributes could have an independent effect on whether an individual works on 
Sundays, and are controlled for in the analysis. 
The results4 show that without any controls (Model 1), the increases in Sunday premiums led 
to a significant negative effect only in 2011, with no significant effects in any of the other 
years. Overall, the point estimates showed effects of varying direction magnitude, and were 
generally insignificant.  
Model 2 shows the results after controlling for important demographic differences 
(particularly for being under the age of 25). The estimated effects of the premium changes are 
virtually the same as Model 1. Model 2 indicates that those under the age of 25are 
significantly more likely to work on Sundays. 
The final model (Model 3) includes controls for the individual’s employment arrangements – 
namely whether they worked in a large enterprise, or were a union member5. With the 
addition of these controls, no negative effect in 2011 could be identified, and a weakly 
positive effect was found following the premium increase in 2012.  Across Models 1 to 3, the 
sum of the treatment dummy variables was not statistically different from zero, indicating 
                                                 
4Estimates from a linear probability model are given. Partial effects from a probit model were very similar, and are available 
upon request.  
5 It should be noted that while Table 4 indicated differences between states in the proportion of part-time and casual 
employees, these variables were excluded in Model 3 to allow for the possibility that the policy change might affect Sunday 
employment through the employment of more part-time and casual employees. The inclusion of these variables did not 
materially change the coefficients on the policy-date variables; rather, their inclusion acts to reduce the size of the coefficient 
on “Less than 25 years old”, reflecting the greater propensity of younger workers to be employed part-time or casually. 
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We test the identifying assumptions of our empirical strategy by re-estimating the model for 
the likelihood of working on Saturdays. As there were no changes to Saturday wage rates in 
NSW, there should be no change in the likelihood of NSW retail employees working on 
Saturdays, and the estimated placebo effect in NSW should be small and insignificant. The 
results in the last two columns of Table 6 show that, as expected, there were no significant 
effects in any of the individual years. In addition, the test on the cumulative impact also 
found no significant effects. This supports our empirical model of changes in Sunday 
employment. 
These results using individual-level data show that employees were not less likely to work on 
Sundays as a result of higher Sunday wage rates. Taken together with the results on the 
number of jobs and hours per worker, the analysis concludes that while hours per worker fell, 
employers did not reduce the number of workers, nor remove Sunday employees from their 
Sunday shifts. The most likely explanation is that Sunday hours for existing Sunday 
employees (and potentially hours on other days of the week) were reduced in response to the 
announcement of higher Sunday wages. We are unable to confirm this with certainty 
however, as data on hours of employment by day-of-the-week is unavailable. 
 
It is important to acknowledge some limitations of the analysis. Due to the nature of available 
data, it is impossible to isolate the effect of the policy change on those most directly affected 
by it – award reliant retail employees whose wages were directly determined by the award 
rates. Unpublished data from the ABS’ Survey of Employee Earnings and Hours (a survey of 
8000 employers nationally) suggests that since the introduction of modern awards, the 
number of award reliant employees – those paid exactly the award rate – has risen steadily 
from around 64,300 to 97,900 (or 21.8 to 28.3% of all employees) in NSW. In Victoria, the 
number increased from 53,400 to 94,100 (from 24.4 to 31.1% of all employees), as shown in 
Figure 6.  (These numbers exclude those whose pay or conditions are influenced by, but not 
exactly on, the award.) 
 
The empirical models set out above measure changes in the number of workers, hours per 
worker, and the probability of working on Sunday, across all employees, and not solely those 
who are award reliant. While this may be regarded as less precise, it is also appropriate and 
important because Australia’s methods of wage determination are complex and not 
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independent of one another. Consequently, changes in award conditions typically have 
extended impacts on employees on over-awards and covered by collective and even 
individual agreements. Investigation of all employees, and not just those who are award-













The analysis is also unable to distinguish between the effects of the changes in Sunday 
premiums and other, smaller, changes that occurred as part of the transitional arrangements of 
the award modernization process.  As described in Table 1Table 1, casual loadings increased 
slightly in NSW from 15% to 25% – 2 percentage points annually; and, Victorian Saturday 
premiums decreased, on average across the award classifications, from the equivalent of 
about 33% to 25% - about 1.6 percentage points per annum.  Consequently, employment 
effects identified in the analysis may conflate the impact of the higher Sunday premiums and 
these two other changes. The three changes – higher NSW casual loadings, lower Saturday 
premiums in Victoria, and higher Sunday premiums in NSW, were phased in over the same 
five-year period. These two changes (higher NSW casual loadings, and lower Victorian 
Saturday loadings) act in the same direction to potentially overstate the effects of the changes 
in NSW Sunday premiums; therefore, the results can be considered as an upper-bound 
estimate. It should also be remarked however that the magnitude of the change in the Sunday 
premiums (10 percentage points each year) was far larger than the other changes. 
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Collectively, the results suggest that following the announcement of higher Sunday wage 
premiums, the principal adjustment channel used by employers was hours per employee, 
rather than employee numbers. The results indicate that there were significant reduction of 
hours per employee, concentrated in the period following the announcement date in 2008. 
This compares to – at best – weakly significant effects on the total number of employees in 
response to higher Sunday penalty rates. The results for effects on hours per employee should 
be regarded with caution however, as there was no commensurate decline in Sunday 
employment, nor were there negative effects found across the entire period from 
announcement through implementation. 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 
Following announced increases in Sunday wage premia in NSW’s retail industry, we found 
no effects on the number of employees, and significant negative effects on hours per worker, 
The adjustments to employee hours were made almost immediately following the policy 
announcement, with no significant effects found in the period following implementation for 
either number of employees or hours per employees, implying many employers pay more 
attention to news about the existence and size of a premium increase than about their timing. 
These results held, taking into account state-specific economic conditions, including total and 
youth employment conditions, industry demand, and state-specific employment trends.   
A number of explanations for these weak employment effects following implementation have 
been considered. First is the possibility of substitution effects – either substitution away from 
Sunday employment, or substitution between employee categories (eg younger for older 
employees, or non award-reliant for award-reliant employees). We have examined these 
substitution effects where ever possible. Rich data on individual retail employees, in 
particular whether they worked on Sundays, was used to investigate this potential distribution 
of employment away from Sundays and/or towards younger workers. The results showed that 
the cumulative effect on Sunday employment was not statistically different from zero; year-
to-year, the effects were also found to be statistically insignificant and inconsistent. However, 
it is possible that rather than reduce the number of Sunday workers, employers instead 
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reduced Sunday hours for existing workers, an outcome which we cannot verify given data 
limitations.  
With regard to younger versus older workers, our analysis of junior workers (available on 
request) showed that while there was a positive effect amongst junior workers, this was the 
case for only one year (2012), not consistently over the period of increasing premiums.  
There was also no commensurate decline in non-junior employees working on Sundays. It is 
likely that other factors are motivating these preferences for deploying junior employees on 
Sundays.  
We are unable to examine the effects arising from the substitution of non-award-reliant 
employees in place of award-reliant employees, due to both the lack of data and the 
interdependence of wage-setting methods. However, Buchanan & Wright (2013:17) found 
that 75 percent of retail employers used award-based pay-setting arrangements, such that it is 
unlikely that a large effect would result from employers drawing on workers unaffected by 
the rise in Sunday rates. 
It is also possible that employment effects were concentrated amongst employees of small 
businesses, who are not well represented in the survey data. The estimated effects on small 
business employees (available upon request) were imprecise as expected, but did not show 
systematically large and negative point estimates.  
Finally, we were unable to examine one key hypothesis for the resulting weak employment 
effects: the ability of employers to pass on higher labour costs to the consumer. There being 
no business-level dataset on operational performance, we are unable to examine this 
possibility.  
Overall, the research showed that while the number of employed retail workers was 
unaffected, it was more likely that there was a negative effect on hours per worker. The 
immediate implication is that, ceteris paribus, the same number of employees worked fewer 
hours as Sunday premiums rose. This supports the notion that in an industry dominated by 
casual and part-time employment, adjustment to employment occurs via flexibility in hours, 
and not in the number of employees. This interpretation of the results suggests that the 
elasticity of aggregate labour demand in response to Sunday wage changes is close to zero if 
demand is measured by the number of jobs, and potentially negative if measured by number 
of hours per employee.  It suggests that increasing Sunday premiums has little effect on the 
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number of employees or on Sunday employment; however, they do have the effect of 
providing compensation for those people who work on Sundays.       
 
What, then, are the policy implications? In the case recently heard by the Australian tribunal, 
the Fair Work Commission, an application was made and granted to significantly cut Sunday 
wage premiums in the retail industry.  Such a decrease will most likely result in virtually the 
same number of employees working longer hours for what would be (assuming an elasticity 
of Sunday labour demand with respect to premiums to have an absolute value less than 1) 
lower aggregate earnings. Unless the relationship of jobs to wages also has elasticity 
significantly less than zero (not supported by our data), there would not even be a rise in their 
number.  The cut in Sunday wage premiums would primarily constitute a transfer of income 
from employees to business owners, with no offsetting increase in the number of employees. 
This is an important consideration, particularly as the FWC’s mandate includes not only the 
employment and industry impacts of their wage decisions, but also explicitly the impact on 
the low-paid sector. The AWALI Survey found that more than half (56.7%) of retail industry 
employees working ‘anti-social’ hours received premiums, and of these, almost a third (32%) 
report relying on premiums to meet normal household expenses (Daly, 2014: 17).  
 
Overall, the research supports the hypothesis that any response to a decrease in Sunday 
premiums is likely to take place via an adjustment of hours per employee, and not the number 
of employees. In this scenario, working more hours and experiencing greater disutility 
associated with working on Sundays, employees in the retail industry, many of whom are 
classified as low-paid, are likely to receive lower total earnings as a result. From the 
perspective of work-life balance policy, there is subsequently little evidence that in the trade-
off between wages and working at undesirable times, workers could be better off over all.  
The findings lend support to the idea that using premiums for unsociable hours is a 
reasonable way to enable compensation for people having to work those unsociable hours—
otherwise, all the benefits flow to employers while increased costs (through lower utility 
arising from greater work-life interference) fall on employees.  Whether it effectively reduces 
the amount of unsociable hours worked by employees is less clear, though international 
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(a) For an adult, full-time employee 
(b) The base hourly rate is for an adult, full time, entry level retail services worker. The rate is as at the end of 2008, at the 
time the draft General Retail Award was released. 
(c) Saturday premiums in Victoria varied by classification. These have been averaged.  A full break down is provided in a 
data appendix available from the authors.  
Source: Australian Industrial Relations Commission (2010a, 2010b), General Retail Award 2010 
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Table 2. Annual changes in employment 
Year 
Annual % change in 
total employed 
 
Annual % change in  
hours per employee 
NSW Victoria NSW Victoria 
2001 5.5 3.7 -0.2 -4.9 
2002 -1.2 4.4 3.9 -0.7 
2003 13.2 6.3 -5.9 2.0 
2004 -5.2 -10.0 -0.5 0.0 
2005 8.3 10.3 4.6 2.5 
2006 -2.8 -0.4 -3.2 -5.5 
2007 -6.6 -0.4 0.2 2.5 
2008 19.8 1.5 2.0 -4.0 
2009 -8.0 -1.7 -2.9 3.3 
2010 -8.8 6.5 0.8 1.1 
2011 7.3 0.7 -2.1 0.1 
2012 -1.8 1.2 -1.8 -5.2 
2013 8.5 -2.7 4.6 -0.4 
2014 -9.3 6.8 -3.9 0.9 
Average pre-2008 3.9 1.9 0.1 -1.0 




Table 3. Wage effects for retail employees in NSW and Victoria 
Hourly wage 









Mean         
NSW 15.85 20.41 19.23 21.00 
Victoria 16.29 20.09 19.22 20.67 
% difference -2.72 1.57 0.07 1.59 
Median         
NSW 13.98 19.18 17.39 19.74 
Victoria 16.95 19.29 17.00 19.34 
% difference -17.50 -0.58 2.31 2.07 
          
n         
NSW 112 295 328 980 
Victoria 95 259 330 976 
Diff-in-Diff 0.095 0.010 




Table 4. Sample means on NSW and Victorian retail employees in HILDA, pooled 
Characteristic 
Before After 
NSW Victoria NSW Victoria 
     
Female 57.4 52.2 61.7 57.3 
Mean age 32.1 32.5 32.5 32.7 
Under 25 years old (%) 44.4 40.3 44.1 38.3 
Non-English speaking background 8.3 8.2 9.3 7.5 
Married or defacto (%) 37.6 39.8 37.1 35.4 
Living in metropolitan area (%) 62.2 66.5 66.3 68.1 
Full time student (%) 25.5 25.8 22.9 23.5 
Education level (%)     
Degree or higher 8.9 9.5 10.4 13.0 
Completed Year 12 49.1 52.6 57.1 58.2 
Year 11 or below 42.0 37.9 32.5 28.9 
Mean weekly hours 29.1 29.4 28.8 29.4 
Employed part time (%) 55.8 52.4 57.9 54.5 
Employed on casual basis (%) 45.0 38.9 41.3 35.4 
Union member (%) 16.3 14.5 20.2 14.5 
Workplace size (%)     
Small (less than 20 employees) 9.9 6.6 6.0 6.3 
Medium (20 to 99 employees) 14.4 6.0 10.9 10.7 
Large (100 or more employees) 75.7 87.4 83.1 83.0 
     
Usually works on Sunday (%) 25.3 22.7 23.7 20.6 
Number of observations 742 686 1167 1119 






Table 5. Employment effects 
Variable 
Number of employees Hours per employee 
Est. Std. Err Est. Std. Err 
after 19/12/2006 -0.001 (0.037) 0.005 (0.021) 
after19/12/2007 0.008 (0.037) 0.009 (0.016) 
after 19/12/2008 (Announcement date) -0.059 (0.050) -0.052** (0.021) 
after 1/7/2010 (First increase) -0.055 (0.034) 0.025 (0.015) 
after 1/7/2011 0.051* (0.029) -0.010 (0.019) 
after 1/7/2012 -0.043 (0.048) -0.034 (0.028) 
after 1/7/2013 -0.003 (0.049) 0.001 (0.014) 
after 1/7/2014 -0.016 (0.029) -0.029* (0.016) 
        
State (NSW) effects 0.415* (0.237) 0.328** (0.149) 
State-specific trend effects 0.000 (0.002) -0.002 (0.001) 
        
        
Employment to population ratio 0.019 (0.021) 0.024* (0.014) 
Youth employment to population ratio 0.006 (0.005) -0.002 (0.005) 
Unemployment rate 0.005 (0.014) 0.018* (0.010) 
Youth unemployment rate 0.000 (0.005) 0.006** (0.003) 
State retail sales -0.382 (0.402) 0.660** (0.309) 
        
n 114 114 
Cumulative post-announcement effects (p-
value) 0.079 0.027 
Cumulative post-implementation effects (p-
value) 0.176 0.180 
Test for lead effects (p-value) 0.848 0.413 
Heteroskedastic and autocorrelation-consistent standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance: *** p<0.01, ** 




Table 6. Effects on the probability of working on Sundays 
Variable Probability of working Sundays Placebo: Pr 
(Working Saturdays) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  
 Est. Std. Err Est. Std. 
Err 
Est. Std. Err Est. Std. 
Err 
after 19/12/2008 (Announcement) 0.041 (0.043) 0.034 (0.042) 0.032 (0.053) 0.003 (0.058) 
after 1/7/2010 (First increase) -0.001 (0.045) 0.001 (0.044) 0.017 (0.058) 0.083 (0.063) 
after 1/7/2011 -0.094** (0.044) -0.091** (0.044) -0.079 (0.057) 0.005 (0.061) 
after 1/7/2012 0.046 (0.039) 0.056 (0.039) 0.082* (0.049) 0.010 (0.055) 
after 1/7/2013 0.017 (0.042) 0.015 (0.041) -0.032 (0.052) -0.064 (0.055) 
             
Demographic controls             
Less than 25 years old   0.145*** (0.023) 0.188*** (0.025) 0.179*** (0.029) 
Gender (Female)   0.022 (0.019) 0.015 (0.021) -0.051** (0.025) 
Married or de facto   -0.012 (0.024) -0.018 (0.028) 0.018 (0.033) 
Number of dependent children   -0.019* (0.010) -0.015 (0.012) -0.007 (0.015) 
Year 11 or below education   -0.014 (0.031) 0.007 (0.034) 0.048 (0.041) 
             
Workplace/ employment controls             
Large employer 0.041 (0.042) -0.133** (0.054) 
Union member     0.024 (0.027) -0.057** (0.028) 
             
State (NSW) effects 0.029 (0.032) 0.020 (0.030) -0.006 (0.036) -0.042 (0.042) 
             
No. observations 3714 3714 2505 2505 
Cumulative effects (p-value) 0.8488 0.7346 0.7215 0.5503 
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
 
 
 
